

Holodomor specialist speaks at the Library of Congress

WASHINGTON – Dr. Stanislav Kulchytsky, a noted Ukrainian historian and deputy director of the Institute of Ukrainian History in Ukraine, gave a lecture on the Holodomor on May 30 at the Library of Congress.

The lecture was part of the events surrounding the Holodomor Remembrance Torch's arrival at its last U.S. stop, Washington. The mayor of the city, Adrian M. Fenty, proclaimed that day to be "Holodomor Torch Relay Day."

The occasion was marked by long-sought recognition of the atrocity. Written statements of solidarity were issued by Sens. John McCain and Hilary Clinton, House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, and Reps. Robert Casey and Lincoln Diaz-Balart. In addition, the council of the District of Columbia passed a resolution recognizing the Famine of 1932-1933 and recognizing May 30, 2008, as the official 75th anniversary of the Holodomor.

The lecture at the Library of Congress was sponsored by its European Division and its Professional Association's Ukrainian Language Table, as well as the Embassy of Ukraine in the United States.

One of the key organizers, Ukraine's Ambassador to the United States Oleh Shamshur, in his remarks to the audience gathered in the Library's European Reading Room, credited the U.S. Congress with helping to end the silence surrounding the truth about the Famine.

The event began with a statement by

Librarian of Congress James H. Billington, presented in his absence by Dr. Jeremy Adamson, director for collections and services. Dr. Billington acknowledged the availability of information about the Famine after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He stated, "With a free Ukraine has come freedom of information."

Dr. Billington continued, saying, "Scholars, researchers and the public now have access to material about the special horror of this famine, discovering in-depth what happened three quarters of a century ago."

Dr. Billington noted that the Library of Congress has been aiding research about the Famine since the 1980s and that it holds a number of archival materials relating to the Holodomor. One hundred ten selections from these materials, published in a variety of languages, were on display in the European Reading Room during the lecture. The Library also provided a six-page reader's guide compiled by Jurij Dobczansky and Regina Frackowiak, which highlighted some of the Holodomor-related material at the Library of Congress.

Dr. Billington's statement also noted Dr. Kulchytsky's contribution to public awareness of the Holodomor and invited all to return to use the wealth of resources at the Library of Congress.

Among distinguished members of the Ukrainian community in attendance was Dr. Shamshur and Dr. Paula Dobriansky, undersecretary of democracy and global



Dr. Stanislav Kulchytsky presents the latest book of archival documentation on the Holodomor to the Librarian of Congress.

affairs, U.S. State Department.

Dr. Dobriansky spoke briefly, noting that by remembering those lives lost at the hands of Soviet leaders, present totalitarian-driven genocide can be prevented.

Dr. Kulchytsky then delivered his lecture, which was followed by a question and answer session. (The full text of the lecture appears below.)

At the conclusion of the event,

Holodomor eyewitnesses Maria Halych-Dutkevych of Windsor, Ontario, and Tetiana Pavlichka of Philadelphia were unexpectedly honored with the ceremonial task of carrying the Holodomor Remembrance Torch from the European Reading Room to the Southwest Pavilion, where the Ukraine 3000 Fund had organized a display of 34 Holodomor-related posters.

The Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933: a case of genocide

Following is the text of a lecture delivered by historian Stanislav Kulchytsky of Ukraine at the Library of Congress on May 30. (The text has been edited for clarity by Jurij Dobczansky, senior cataloguing specialist and recommending officer for the Ukraine, Central and East European Languages Team, Social Sciences Cataloguing Division at the Library of Congress.)

Interpretation of the Ukrainian Holodomor of 1932-1933 differs in contemporary Ukraine and Russia. The Ukrainian Parliament adopted a law that defines the Holodomor as genocide. When this bill was under consideration in the Verkhovna Rada, the Institute of History of Ukraine submitted to national deputies a convincing array of evidence.

The genocidal character of this crime perpetrated by Joseph Stalin was highlighted in our publications of the early 1990s, yet our Russian colleagues blame the Institute for allegedly distorting the facts at the government's request.

Let us leave aside the issue of whether one should consider as genocide the death by famine of hundreds of thousands of people in different regions of the USSR, including Ukraine, because of mandatory government grain procurement requisitions.

Let us remember another: the death of millions of people caused by the confiscation of all food under the procurement pretext. Until the last months of 1932, people in Ukraine, as well as in other regions, were dying because their bread was taken away. However, starting from November 1932 they were dying because all other food was taken from them – not only bread.

This carefully disguised crime staged against the backdrop of famine in other parts of the Soviet Union had its own reasons. This crime was different from the hunger in the rest of the USSR caused by the forced pace of industrialization and Stalin's resolve to make the collective farm system an integral element of the centrally

planned economy.

As a rule, our opponents present the following three arguments, which they claim deflate the interpretation of the Holodomor as genocide. First, people of different nationalities were starved to death in Ukrainian villages. Second, nobody persecuted Ukrainians based on their nationality. Third, they refer to the large-scale food aid program in 1933 organized by the Soviet government and targeting specifically the population of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Kuban region.

The argument about the death of people of different nationalities in the Ukrainian countryside is apparently not very persuasive. Stalin's strike was aimed at rural areas of Ukraine. It is obvious that not only Ukrainians inhabited the villages.

The second argument, at first glance, looks rather convincing. Ukrainians were not killed just for the fact that they were born Ukrainians, i.e., as an ethnic group. But at the same time, ethnic Ukrainians were the so called "titular nation," i.e., representatives of their own state with vast constitutional rights.

Whom was Stalin trying to destroy? James Mace was the first to state that the terror targeted not the people of a certain ethnicity or occupation, but the citizens of the Ukrainian state that emerged for a few brief years after the collapse of the Russian empire, quickly suffered its own demise and was reincarnated in the form of the Soviet Ukrainian state. The algorithm of execution by starvation of Ukrainians as representatives of the state nation is presented in Dr. Mace's report to the first academic conference on the Holodomor of 1932-1933, held in Montreal in 1983.

Finally, our opponents say that the fact that the Famine-Genocide was man-made is at odds with the fact that food aid was provided to the victims. Indeed, some food was provided, but at a later stage of the Holodomor.

One may think that this information on food aid for starving farmers of Ukraine

injected into history papers is a blow to the genocide theory. But one should not jump to conclusions.

I believe that genocide can take two forms: direct ethnic purges or terror through famine. Genocide against the Jews is a typical example of ethnic purge. Can the Holodomor qualify for the same definition?

Many in Ukraine call the Holodomor "the Ukrainian Holocaust." One can agree with this statement when we compare the scope of both tragedies. On the other hand, these tragedies are very different. Ethnic purge is in most cases "purging" the territory for another nation.

In this regard, the Nazis used the term "living space" ("lebensraum") and developed the so called "Ost" plan aimed at cleansing the territory of Eastern Europe as far as Crimea of the local population in the name of creating a Greater Germany.

The Holodomor should be viewed as terror by famine. This form of terror falls within the purview of the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Convention defines genocide as complete or partial elimination of a group of people. Any form of terror aims to repress a part of the population in order to terrify the whole. Terror in its different forms was the chief method of building communism in the Soviet Union.

The Kremlin confiscated all food from the starving Ukrainian village in order to prevent social upheaval. This action was meant to aggravate the hunger to the fullest extent, because a starving person is incapable of active protest. Stalin understood that in 1921. At that time, the Terror Famine was used in Ukraine to deal with the alleged "banditry of farmers."

It was organized by extorting the rest of the grain from farmers in the Southern provinces who were already starving. Originally, the hunger was caused by severe drought that hit the entire south of Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus and the Volga region.

So, having used the weapon of famine

efficiently to break farmers' opposition, Stalin could afford to order from February 1933 the feeding via collective farms of those who were able to work. In other words, the government first robbed the people of all food to eliminate the possibility of an uprising, starved millions of them to death and only then started to hand-feed those who still survived.

Based upon testimonies of former Ukrainian citizens, Robert Conquest, in his book "The Harvest of Sorrow," stated that the terror was aimed at Ukrainians. In his "Economic History of the USSR," Alec Nove wrote that Stalin's strike was aimed at peasants, among whom there were many Ukrainians, rather than at Ukrainians, among whom there were a lot of peasants. Even today scholars still argue about whom Stalin was trying to purge – Ukrainians or peasants?

But that is the wrong question to ask.

The Holodomor of 1932-1933 was the consequence of a combination of specific circumstances of time and place.

During 1918-1920 the Bolsheviks succeeded in laying down the foundations of the command economy. Beginning in 1929 Stalin started another "breakthrough," trying to finish the business that Vladimir Lenin could not finish: to force millions of farmers into communes. This resulted in a social upheaval in the first quarter of 1930. Stalin had to pull back and suspend overall "collectivization" for half a year.

One may think that the story of collectivization is well-known. But from the documents published by Russian historian Victor Danilov in his five-volume work "Tragedy of the Soviet Village," one can draw an unexpected conclusion. In 1930-1932 the state did not differentiate between collective farms and state-owned farms: everything produced on these farms was expropriated. State farm workers received wages, while collective farm workers were left with whatever they produced on their own personal plots.

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The Ukrainian Famine...

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In April 1930 the law on grain procurement was adopted: collective farms had to give to the state from a third to a quarter of their gross output. The lion's share of the harvest was to be distributed among the peasants.

Was to, but was not.

The world crisis of 1929-1930 resulted in a slump in the prices of industrial equipment. Soviet trade organizations were buying up everything they could get at reduced prices. It turned out that food prices plummeted even lower. The Soviet Union was not able to get any long-term loans until it agreed to pay off tsarist Russia's debts.

The only way to earn hard currency and pay the bills was to sell more grain. Grain procurement plans had no realistic limits. The state confiscated all of the harvest from collective farms in order to increase export.

Realizing that the government was taking away all grain, farmers in collective farms started to work in a slipshod fashion. The harvest was damaged by weeds because nobody cared. Over-ripe grain fell to the ground and was lost because it was not harvested in a timely manner. Harvest losses increased due to badly managed transportation.

In short, harvest losses were the consequence of farmers' economic disinterest. But the Kremlin explained away the disastrous decreases in grain procurements as organized sabotage, grain concealment and theft.

Hence, on August 7, 1932, Stalin personally wrote the resolution of the USSR Central Executive Committee "On the protection of state property at enterprises, collective farms and cooperatives." According to the document, a person who stole collective farm property could be shot dead or imprisoned for at least 10 years.

By this time the economic crisis had worsened. The Kremlin had to cut its military budget and capital construction expenses. Specially created grain procurement commissions were urgently dispatched to the main grain-producing regions (Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus, the Volga region) during the autumn of 1932. The activities of these commissions led to the famine not only there, but also in the grain-consuming regions that were partially withdrawn from the centralized supply.

Official propaganda depicted "food complications" as a consequence of the kulaks' (wealthy peasants) sabotage on the collective farms. But the government knew the causes of the crisis perfectly well. On January 19, 1933, another resolution was adopted by the Communist Party: "On obligatory grain supply to the state by collective farms and private households."

Could one document drastically change the relations between the leaders of the country's economy and the farmers? It surely could and here is an example: the decision to switch from so-called food distribution (prodrozkladka) to the food tax (prodpodatok) marked the beginning of a new economic policy. The regulation of January 19, 1933, stipulated that the amount of food to be taken by the state in the form of a tax should be known in advance, even before the beginning of the year.

The tax character of the supplies meant that the grain seeded on collective farms belonged to farmers. For the first time, the state acknowledged the farmers' and collective farms' property rights to the raised harvest.

Why did Stalin not confine himself to these reasonable economic measures to overcome the crisis but instead added the terror campaign against Ukrainian regions? To answer that question, it is important to remember that the Terror Famine was aimed not only at Ukrainian peasants.



Jurij Dobczansky

A view of the audience in the European Reading Room at the Library of Congress during the lecture by Holodomor historian Dr. Stanislav Kulchytsky.

Stalin's repressions also focused on the Communist Party of Ukraine, whose half a million members were eventually reduced by 50 percent. The party's leadership was exterminated completely in 1937. That was the beginning of the persecution of the Ukrainian intelligentsia as punishment for having taken part in the national liberation movement.

Stalin's often quoted letter to Lazar Kaganovich of August 11, 1932, was revealed in the year 2000. Alarmed by developments in Ukraine, Stalin intended to appoint Kaganovich as secretary general of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Stalin also planned to send the deputy chief of the OGPU (predecessor of the KGB), Balytsky, to Ukraine. Explaining these personnel readjustments, Stalin said: "Without these and similar actions [economic and political consolidation of Ukraine and its frontier regions in the first place] we may lose Ukraine."

Recently OGPU reports to the Kremlin have been made known to the public. The situation was difficult everywhere, but Stalin singled out Ukraine – a national republic with tremendous economic and human potential at the border of Europe. He did not forget that it took three attempts to conquer Ukraine in 1917-1919. He remembered also that in the spring of 1920 the Ukrainian Communist Party conference rejected the list of Central Committee members recommended by Lenin and elected other leaders according to its own wishes.

Stalin did not forget March 1930, when collectivization in Right-Bank Ukraine had to be suspended because of social upheaval.

Our opponents underestimate the national background of the crisis that took place at the beginning of 1930s. For them, a starving Ukrainian peasant remains just a peasant and not a citizen of the Ukrainian state. They consider the Soviet Union as a group of republics deprived of any rights. But it became such only after the famine of 1932-1933 and the terror of 1937-1938. Prior to that, the Soviet Union was an alliance of

states.

Soviet statehood is a very complex concept, both in its original Russian dimension and in its derivative national aspect. The pan-Soviet center neither associated itself with Russia (which would have run counter to the Constitution of the USSR), nor did it endeavor to create in Moscow a competitive center of Russian power. The concept of "together and equal" introduced at the time of the USSR's creation by merging the Russian and Transcaucasian Federations, Ukraine and Belarus, hiccupped decades later during the confrontation in 1990-91 between the pan-Soviet center (the Kremlin) and the Russian Federation (Moscow). This confrontation eventually tore the Soviet Union apart.

Until the constitutional reform of Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet power was a combination of the Communist Party dictatorship and the administrative authority of Soviet councils and their executive committees. This authoritative tandem was dual. For that reason, the Bolsheviks succeeded in revamping the centralized empire in the form of a conglomeration of independent (since 1923 – allied) states. Soviet constitutions did not even mention the existence of the party with its chiefs' dictatorship.

What was so dangerous about this dual authority at the time of transition from Soviet statehood in the Kremlin to national statehood? The people's councils, or the soviets, including national ones, concentrated real executive authority and gave the party its legitimacy by affiliating its members within the administrative structure. There was no threat of the USSR's disintegration as long as this authority was under the Kremlin's direct control. But as soon as the control shifted to regional structures (when the central authority went into crisis), the danger of collapse became real. The biggest challenge for the Kremlin was associated with Ukraine – a republic with strong traditions of non-Soviet-type statehood.

After the USSR was created, the Kremlin started a campaign in the nation-

al republics called "korenizatsiya." The term came from the word "korin" (root), and the purpose of the campaign was to introduce Soviet power and mentality deep into the roots of non-Russian societies. Korenizatsiya in Ukraine soon went beyond the scope of a bureaucratic campaign and became an instrument of national renaissance. After the population census of 1926, Ukrainian leaders persistently raised before the Communist Party's Politburo the issue of joining to Ukraine the neighboring territories of the Russian Federation (like the Kuban region) where ethnic Ukrainians constituted the overwhelming majority. These petitions were not successful, but they did result in obtaining the Kremlin's consent for the Ukrainianization of these territories. The Kuban region soon transferred all administrative correspondence, mass media and schools from the Russian to the Ukrainian language to reflect the population's needs. The Kremlin watched this process with increasing concern.

A totally Ukrainian Kuban would end up becoming the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which would mean increasing even more the great human potential of Ukraine within the USSR. For that reason, Stalin labeled Ukrainianization outside the borders of the Ukrainian SSR as "Petliurivska" – after Ukrainian national leader Symon Petliura.

Hence, on December 14, 1932, a resolution was passed by Soviet authorities demanding an immediate switch from the Ukrainian to the Russian language of all the Soviet and cooperative bodies' administrative correspondence, as well as all newspapers and school curriculum throughout the Ukrainianized regions of the Northern Caucasus.

Therefore, the second part of 1932 became a point at which two crises crossed and overlapped – one in social economic policy and the other in national policy of the Kremlin. Stalin was very afraid of social upheaval in starving Ukraine. Therefore, repressions were aimed both at Ukrainian peasants (Terror Famine) and at the Ukrainian intelligentsia (individual terror on a mass scale and the "purging" of the ranks of the Communist Party of Ukraine).

On the one hand, the main thrust of repressions was aimed not at people of a particular ethnic group, but against citizens of the Ukrainian state. On the other hand, it was clear that the large majority of those were those same Ukrainians. Even in the straitjacket of a Soviet republic, the mere existence of Ukrainians posed a threat to the Kremlin.

When we say that the state pushed the Ukrainian peasantry into total dependency by confiscating all the food reserves, our opponents demand: Show us a document. They claim: If there is no document, there was no genocide.

Holodomor survivors and witnesses tell many stories about special brigades that conducted requisitions in farmers' households, taking away all the food supply. Dozens, hundreds and thousands of testimonies from people of different settlements and communities, when put together, create an integral picture. This picture brings us to the only possible conclusion: those who searched the households must have been guided by a special order even if that order was not fixed on paper. Yet they still demand a written document from us.

Well, it is possible to present some written evidence. In November 1932 Stalin sent the afore mentioned emergency grain procurement commission to the Ukrainian SSR under the guidance of his close crony, Molotov. Molotov drafted the texts of two party regulations; the final texts were signed by Stalin. These regulations contain articles about fines-in-kind – by confiscating meat and potatoes.

On January 1, 1933, Stalin sent a

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Filmmaker Halya Kuchmij begins work on 'William Kurelek: The People's Painter'

ETOBICOKE, Ontario – Award-winning filmmaker Halya Kuchmij has recently begun work on a feature length documentary film about Ukrainian Canadian artist William Kurelek (1927-1977).

The film, titled "William Kurelek: The People's Painter," has received initial funding from Bravo Television and the Canadian Television Fund for research and development. The film's producer is Winifred (Winn) Kuplowsky, best known for her work with Help Us Help The Children, a project of the Children of Chernobyl Canadian Fund and "Chernobyl 20 Memorial Concert" (2006).

The Kurelek film project has received the support of Jean Kurelek, the artist's widow, and her family and Av Isaacs, Kurelek's art dealer.

The production of this documentary film is the initiative of Ms. Kuchmij, who has received the recognition of her peers as an accomplished documentary producer and director. With 30 years' experience at the CBC and the National Film Board, she has won over 50 awards nationally and internationally. In 2006 she received the Media Award from the Ukrainian Canadian Professional and Business Club (Toronto) in recognition of her outstanding body of work and in particular, films dealing with Ukrainian subject matter.

Kurelek's story is inherently dramatic, being that of a young impoverished prairie farm boy of Ukrainian ancestry,

who battled his personal demons to become one of Canada's most beloved and successful artists. He is perhaps best known for his paintings depicting everyday life among many of the ethnic groups that settled in Canada, whether they were Ukrainian, Polish, Jewish, Irish, Inuit or French Canadian. Kurelek's art had a raw intensity that reflected his own life and the ritual of family life among the founding peoples of Canada.

Kurelek was awarded with the Order of Canada in 1976. By the time of his premature death in 1977, he had produced over 2,000 paintings as well as numerous books and autobiographies. His works can be found in prominent collections at The National Gallery of Canada, The Museum of Modern Art and the Art Gallery of Ontario. He is a Canadian icon, renowned not only nationally but also internationally.

"William Kurelek: The People's Painter" will be shown in theaters as well as on television; DVDs will be made available for personal and educational sales. Three language versions will be made – English, French and Ukrainian. Filming will take place in Canada (Alberta, Manitoba and Ontario), England, Mexico and Ukraine, following the trajectory of Kurelek's life story. Completion is slated for early 2010.

The project currently is in the pre-production phase, which requires the sum of \$80,000. Donations in any amount will be greatly appreciated. Each donor will receive a credit in the film, as well as a charitable tax receipt from the Taras Shevchenko Foundation. Checks should be made out to "Shevchenko Foundation-Kurelek" and mailed to the film's producer: Winn Kuplowsky, 6 Vancho Crescent, Etobicoke, ON. M9A 4Z2 CANADA. More information is available by contacting Ms. Kuplowsky at kuplowsky@rogers.com

Ms. Kuchmij is a well-known Ukrainian Canadian director, who has worked in film and television for the past 30 years winning many national and international awards, among them the Genie, eight Gemin nominations, the Gabriel award, the Anik, eight Chris awards, the New York Film and Television award and the Sovereign award.

Some of her films dealing with Ukrainian subject matter are: "The Strongest Man in the World," "Laughter in My Soul,"



Self-portrait by William Kurelek.

"Millennium," "Chernobyl: The Legacy," "Pierre le Canadien" and "The Fullness of Time: Ukrainian Stories from Alberta."

Ms. Kuchmij has worked for the CBC for the past 25 years and prior to that was a director at the National Film Board of Canada. She has two university degrees (Honors B.A., Bachelor of Fine Arts) and also graduated as a "director fellow" from the American Film Institute.

Ms. Kuplowsky is well known in the Ukrainian Canadian community as a community activist, organizer and fundraiser. She is a founding member of Help Us Help the Children as well as a director and second vice-president with the Children of Chernobyl Canadian Fund, a volunteer organization that brings aid to

victims of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster and to children living in Ukrainian orphanages.

Ms. Kuplowsky has produced fundraising events and galas, the most recent being a world-class Chernobyl memorial concert at Roy Thompson Hall (2006). For the past 25 years, she has also worked in a number of interdisciplinary fields, among them education, creative production and volunteerism.

Born in Scotland of Irish parentage, she is married to Walter Kuplowsky, a Ukrainian Canadian lawyer with Mitchell, Bardyn and Zalucky. They have three sons. Ms. Kuplowsky has two university degrees (Honors B.A., Bachelor of Education).



Filmmaker Halya Kuchmij

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telegram to the former capital of Ukraine – the city of Kharkiv – telling his government there "to inform broadly through village councils, collective farms, collective and individual farmers that: a) those, who hand over voluntarily to the state the previously stolen or hidden grain will not be subject to repressions; b) the collective farms, collective and individual farmers that persistently continue to conceal grain stolen and hidden from registration, will suffer the most severe penalty measures envisaged by the regulatory document of the Central Executive Committee of August 7, 1932."

The above telegram looks strange. Never before did Stalin address farmers of the Soviet republics with direct threats. Besides, he knew very well that Ukraine did not have any more bread because searches conducted by special police units in December 1932 produced minimal results. The content of this document becomes clear when one

combines two points. The second point was addressed to all those who ignored the requirement of the first one and did not give up all grain. How could one determine individuals who were hiding grain? Only by conducting house-searches. In this way Stalin's telegram was an implied order for searches.

Holodomor survivors report that during the searches, not only potatoes and meat, but actually all food was taken away from farmers as envisaged in the resolutions on fines-in-kind. In this way, the telegram points directly to the person – Stalin – who issued the order that clearly meant a repressive campaign on expropriation of food and on organization of the Terror Famine.

At present, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory is finalizing its work on a commemorative book of Holodomor victims. One of its chapters consists of testimonies of Holodomor survivors regarding the confiscation of all food. This means that the government deliberately created conditions incompatible with survival. Hundreds of testimonies from different locations span

the whole of Ukraine. This map can serve as proof in any court.

Stalin did not confine himself to confiscation of food. On January 22, 1933, he personally – there is a document with his original signature – wrote a directive to the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Peoples' Commissars, ordering the leaders of neighboring regions to seal the borders with Ukraine and the Kuban region.

After the Holodomor and mass repressions of 1937-1938 Ukraine lost its potential for rebellion (with the exception of its western regions that became a part of the USSR in 1939).

Stalin's powerful blow was targeted specifically against Ukrainians within the borders of Soviet Ukraine as representatives of the "titular" nation, and against the Ukrainians of the Kuban region who dared to implement "Ukrainianization à la Petliura" with the purpose of joining the national republic and thus obtaining also the status of the "titular" nation.

If that blow had targeted only the peas-

antry, it would have had to be regarded as sociocide. Such sociocide was the campaign throughout the entire Soviet Union to "exterminate kulaks – wealthy farmers – as class." However, Stalin's blow was directed not only against Ukrainian farmers, but also – in a different form – against the Ukrainian intelligentsia as the carrier of the national liberation movement of 1917-1920, and against members of the Communist Party of Ukraine as the carrier of constitutionally enshrined national statehood.

Stalin himself admitted that "the peasant issue" was one kind of "nationality issue." That is why he used the most horrible weapon against farmers – the Terror Famine. This terror aimed at creating conditions incompatible with physical existence (total expropriation of food, sealing of borders, ban on recognition of the famine) is well-documented. This compendium of facts proves clearly that the Ukrainian Holodomor ought to be qualified as genocide on the basis of nationality, in accordance with the U.N. Convention.