

# Ending the Angolan Conflict: Our Time Has Come to be Heard

Towards the Realization of the International Year of the Culture of Peace

Windhoek, Namibia, July 3, 2000

Dedicated to the Search For Durable Peace in Angola

*“If the Angolan people were not heard for the war to start, let them be heard for it to end.”*

Pastoral Message  
Catholic Bishops of Angola  
Luanda, March 29, 2000

NSHR is an independent African human rights advocacy and monitoring non-governmental organization based in Namibia. Concerned with international human rights and humanitarian treaties, especially those adopted by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, Namibians founded the organization in 1989 in order to promote strict compliance.

NSHR maintains observer status in the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights and is in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

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## **Foreword**

*The United Nations Security Council, the European Union and several international human rights bodies in the Northern Hemisphere have said and done much about the symptoms of the ongoing Angolan conflict. However, they have said and done little about the structural root and proximate causes of that conflict. The time has now come to tackle the real sources of the Angolan conflict, as a disease can only be eradicated by treating it, not only its symptoms.*

*Furthermore, the international community appears to ignore the views of the Angolan people spearheaded by the Angolan Church and other civil society actors. The time has also come for indigenous African civil society actors and governments such as South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia and other pro-dialogue nations in the SADC region to be heard and their views to be taken into consideration. 'Our time has come'.*

*Phil ya Nangoloh, Sr  
Executive Director  
July 3, 2000*

## **I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Ever since its inception on December 1, 1989, NSHR has been seized with the close monitoring of the human rights, humanitarian and security situation in Angola. Hence, the organization is well informed and knowledgeable about the structural root causes and exacerbating and triggering factors of the long-running Angolan conflict. NSHR is of the view that the UN, through certain actions or statements emanating from its Security Council, has failed to create--and even undermined--an atmosphere of mutual confidence between the two Angolan warring parties.

This state of affairs stems from the apparent UN failure to grasp, and make a distinction between, the structural root causes and exacerbating factors and triggering factors of the armed conflict in that country. The imposition of sanctions against UNITA has further undermined confidence and strengthened the resolve of the oppressed peoples by heightening their sense of collective persecution and has exacerbated their perception of cultural and economic deprivation which are among the structural root causes of the conflict in the first place.

The international community has been behaving like a physician selectively treating the symptoms, but not diagnosing the root causes, of the Angolan disease. This report therefore proposes measures towards a durable solution to the conflict in that country.

It thus attempts to identify the structural root causes and exacerbating and triggering factors of the armed conflict. It also attempts to point out in chronological order: how several peace agreements on Angola collapsed due to the poor management of the de-colonization process; the impact of Cold War rivalry on building a democratic socio-economic and political order; intolerance and lack of accountability and transparency on the part of the ruling elite; technical and logistical shortcomings in the implementation of peace agreements; geo-political ambitions and international conspiracy involving external economic interests; and other factors.

NSHR is of the opinion that the *Bicesse Accords* of May 31, 1991, should continue to be the basic framework in accordance with which the Angolan conflict could be ended. The Lusaka Protocol of November 20, 1994 is, on several counts, in conflict with both the *Alvor Agreement* and *Bicesse Accords*. The Protocol was also reached and was being implemented under a state of war and or threat of war<sup>1</sup>, coercion, threats and ultimatums that characterized UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and statements issued between December 1992 and March 2000. A mediating body is bound to fail to gain the confidence and cooperation of a disputant against whom such body threatens or applies sanctions or force.

Therefore confrontational and, in some cases, hostile UNSC statements and resolutions cannot reasonably be expected to create mutual confidence between two warring parties, the absence of which constitutes the single biggest obstacle to long-lasting peace in Angola. Hence, the Protocol should either be reconciled with especially the *Bicesse Accords* or be declared redundant and shelved.

Finally, the report makes certain observations and conclusions and in the end makes recommendations on how the Angolan conflict could best be resolved.

## **II. STRUCTURAL ROOT CAUSES**

### **1. Colonial Legacies**

The long-running Angolan armed conflict is structurally rooted in the legacies of colonialism, the seeds of which were first sown with the arrival of Portuguese in 1550.

Deep-rooted and institutionalized animosities based on class, race and politicized ethnicity remain at the heart of this conflict. Making up more than 45 percent of the Angolan population, the Ovimbundu and other peoples in the central highlands are pitted against the assimilated Kimbundu (i.e. *assimilados*) and the mixed race (i.e. *mestiço*) peoples, who reside in the coastal areas of the country around Luanda, the Angolan capital. The latter two groups make up less than 25 percent of the population.

Male Ovimbundu people were forcibly sent to work as slaves on coffee and sugar plantations by their Portuguese colonial masters. They were seen as hard workers and cheap laborers. While the female Ovimbundu people were, among other things, forced to construct roads through thick forests into the hinterland. Also, members of the Ovimbundu ethnic group were principally the ones who were exported as slaves to work on sugar and coffee plantations in the Americas, notably Brazil.

Even today the *mestiços* and *assimilados* look down upon the historically marginalized Ovimbundu, Bakongo, Chokwe and other indigenous African peoples as ‘barbarians’ or ‘backward’. The former groups have had close association with the Portuguese colonialists over a period of some 450 years and make up the significant proportion of Angola’s original urban population. As a consequence, the Ovimbundu and other rural peoples still largely resent their *assimilado* and *mestiço* country peoples.

## **2. Anti-Colonial Resistance: National Liberation Movements**

Apart from their broader socio-economic, political and military objectives, the three Angolan resistance movements were, right from the beginning, either regionally or ethnically based.

### **2.1. The MPLA**

In 1956 *mestiço* and *assimilado* intellectuals from the coastal cities founded the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in order to secure the release of their colleagues at the time imprisoned by Portuguese colonialists.

### **2.2. The FNLA**

Originally called the Union of the People of Angola (UPA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) was founded in 1961. At the time it launched a violent armed uprising in order to expel the Portuguese, *mestiço* and *assimilado* peoples from the northwestern areas of Angola.

### **2.3. UNITA**

The Ovimbundu and other central highlands peoples, on the other hand, formed the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in 1966. UNITA was, among other things, also founded as an alternative to the dominance of MPLA by *mestiço* and *assimilado* intellectuals and the FNLA by Kikongo-speaking northerners<sup>2</sup>.

### **2.4. The Logic of Conflict**

UNITA purports to represent 'the real' Africans, sons and daughters of the soil, living in the rural areas and fighting against a wealthy, cosmopolitan and better-educated urban elite. Today, this elite makes up the bulk of the political and military support for the ruling MPLA.

The military logic of the present Angolan civil war is structurally rooted in, and reflects, this fundamental division.

These then are the historical structural root causes of the current civil conflict in Angola.

### **III. EXACERBATING AND TRIGGERING FACTORS**

The Angolan conflict has been and is exacerbated by, *inter alia*, the poor management of the de-colonization process; over-centralization of political and military power, oppression and political exclusion; deep-rooted mutual suspicion on the part of the two main warring parties; disparate and hidden geo-political interests of Cold War protagonists; external business rivalry for Angola's vast oil and mineral resources; hostile propaganda and misinformation; real or perceived lack of UNSC impartiality; delays in the implementation of peace agreements; unrealistic expectations and bad faith on the part of certain mediators and parties to the conflict; and the use of inflammatory or coercive language and threats or ultimatums by especially the UNSC as well as technical and logistical deficiencies in the deployment of UN peace-keeping operations.

#### **1. The Alvor Agreement & the De-colonization Process**

On April 25, 1974, General Antonio de Spínola overthrew the Portuguese dictatorial regime led by Prime Minister Marcello Caetano. This led to the suspension of Portuguese military operations against the three Angolan liberation movements. The military coup in Portugal led to a fierce civil conflict among the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. The Communist Party-led Portuguese Government through the then governor-general of Angola, Admiral Rosa Coutinho, also deliberately instigated<sup>3</sup> such conflict.

On January 15, 1975, at Alvor in Portugal, the armed three movements made peace and agreed to a joint de-colonization process through the establishment of a transitional government of national unity to be effected on November 11 of the same year. However, heavy fighting broke out again and on August 11, 1975, the MPLA, thanks to massive Cuban and Soviet military assistance, took exclusive control of Luanda.

In June 1975, Cuban forces assumed a direct combat role in Angola on the side of the MPLA. The United States, on the other hand, covertly supported the FNLA and later UNITA.

#### **2. The First Angolan Civil War**

On November 11, 1975, the MPLA by armed force seized power and unilaterally declared Angola an independent State. On the same day Portugal hurriedly and unceremoniously ended its rule in Angola, leaving political power exclusively in the hands of the MPLA ethnic and racial minority.

The November 11 military coup by the MPLA, also with Cuban and Soviet assistance, violated the provisions of the tripartite Alvor Agreement of January 15, 1975.

On May 10, 1976, following a central committee meeting, UNITA issued the River Cuanza Manifesto, in which it vowed to continue fighting against MPLA, Cuban and Soviet forces, resorting to guerrilla warfare.

*“We will never accept a minority regime imposed by a racist European colonial power... Let the Russians and their Cubans come by their tens of thousands... In the end the people of Angola will win,”*<sup>4</sup> declared UNITA.

At the peak of the Cold War, the United States used UNITA as a proxy force to fight against Soviet and Cuban forces and their MPLA proxy. At the time the US hailed UNITA as “freedom fighters” and vilified the ruling MPLA as “communists.”

The Cold War confrontation on Angolan soil was therefore a *fait accompli*.

Now that the Cold War is over, both the US and Russia have become the main trade partners of the ethnic minority MPLA government. That is to say, their own economic interests in Angola take paramount importance at the expense of the Angolan people. Consequently, UNITA is now called “terrorists and bandits,” while the MPLA is praised as “the legitimate” Government of Angola.

### **3. The Bicesse Accords**

On May 31, 1991, Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA President Dr. Jonas Savimbi signed a peace agreement in Portugal along the lines of the Alvor Agreement, known as the *Bicesse Accords* in an attempt to end the 16-year First Angolan Civil War.

These Accords, also known as *Acordos de Paz*, make provision for a bilateral cease-fire; bilateral quartering of the two forces; bilateral disarmament and disbandment of the two armies; formation of a single neutral national army and police forces; and multiparty elections as well as a monitoring team of some 550<sup>5</sup> military and civilians observers under the auspices of the Second UN Verification Mission (UNAVEM II).

The establishment of the First UN Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) in 1989 had to do with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the implementation of UNSC resolution 435 (1978) as well as the Brazzaville Protocol of December 13, 1988, on Namibian independence.

Under the *Bicesse Accords*, both the MPLA and UNITA also agreed not to buy arms from the US, Russia or any other foreign sources. In terms of the *Triple Zero Option* enshrined in the *Bicesse Accords* the former Cold War protagonists were also obligated to abide by these Accords.<sup>6</sup>

However, on August 25, 1991, the MPLA started importing lethal weapons from Russia. On October 31, 1991, a UNAVEM II report on troop quartering revealed that some 20 percent of the total MPLA armed force of some 115,000<sup>7</sup> troops could not be accounted for. This represents an armed force of between 25,000 and 30,000<sup>8</sup> troops. By all standards the number of MPLA forces remained particularly low in the assembly areas and has even declined by comparison during the latter part of 1991.<sup>9</sup> Also, little, if any, progress was made on the creation<sup>10</sup> of a representative and neutral police force to replace the paramilitary rapid intervention police force of the MPLA, known as the Ninjas.

On September 29-30, 1992, for the first time in Angolan history, multiparty elections were held and on October 17, 1992, the National Elections Commission (CNE) announced the official final<sup>11</sup> election results as follows: in the presidential race<sup>12</sup>, MPLA President Eduardo dos Santos received 49.57 percent to 40.07 percent for UNITA President Jonas Savimbi. However, both Dos Santos and Savimbi fell short of the required 51 percent to qualify as President of Angola. With regard to the final legislative results, the MPLA scored 53.47 percent to UNITA's 34.1 percent.<sup>13</sup>

It is significant to point out that earlier on October 3, 1992, 8 Angolan Opposition parties, including UNITA, rejected the unofficial results, which were prematurely announced by the MPLA on several occasions. Those parties accused the MPLA of a "widespread, massive and systematic irregularities and fraud."<sup>14</sup> At the time the UN Secretary-General urged<sup>15</sup> UNITA not to reject the electoral results, pending investigation of the complaint and emphasized the urgency of a meeting between Dr. Jonas Savimbi and Mr. Eduardo dos Santos.

On October 5, 1992, less than 10 days after the formation of the new army, 11 UNITA generals withdrew in protest against the alleged electoral fraud.<sup>16</sup> The new non-partisan army, with equal<sup>17</sup> numbers of UNITA and MPLA forces, was only formally<sup>18</sup> formed on September 27, 1992, i.e. two days prior to the elections, with fewer than 10,000<sup>19</sup> troops of the envisaged 50,000<sup>20</sup> members in place.

On October 17, 1992, Margaret Anstee, UN Special Representative for Angola, herself tacitly acknowledged that there were, indeed, "irregularities" in the electoral process, but asserted that this did not have a "significant effect on the results." Organizational and logistical difficulties as well as widespread electoral irregularities that characterized the Angolan electoral process also become evident in this rather ambivalent statement by Ms. Anstee:

*"[T]here was no conclusive evidence of a major systematic or widespread fraud, or that the irregularities were of magnitude to have a significant effect on the results officially announced on 17 November. With all deficiencies taken into account, the elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992 can be considered to have been generally free and fair."*<sup>21</sup>

On August 21, 1993, former US Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker had this to say about the elections:

*"The observers present had no way to evaluate the elections. There were few regions of Angola where people could freely express their points of view."*<sup>22</sup>

For the observation and verification of the voting process on September 29-30, 1992, UNAVEM II deployed 400 electoral observers, operating mainly as two-person mobile teams.<sup>23</sup> They only managed to cover 4,000 of the some 6,000 polling stations<sup>24</sup> in a country with an area of 1 246 700 square kilometers.

Of significance is to point out that on October 16, 1992, UNITA had already publicly agreed to accept the unofficial electoral results and to take part in the second round of presidential elections.<sup>25</sup> On October 17-18, 1992, the day when the official election results were announced, a serious shooting incident occurred between MPLA and UNITA forces in the city of Huambo. This led to heightened political tensions in the country.

On October 27, 1992, the UN Secretary-General in a report to the UNSC expressed "serious concern at the deterioration of the political situation and the rising tension"<sup>26</sup> in Angola. This led to the issuance by the President of the Security Council of a statement, among other things,



calling upon UNITA to “respect the results of the elections held on 29 and 30 September”<sup>27</sup> and to “engage in a dialogue without delay.”<sup>28</sup> The President of the UNSC also threatened that “the Security Council will hold responsible any party which refuses to take part in such a dialogue, thereby jeopardizing the entire process.”<sup>29</sup>

In an apparent effort to abide by UNSC threats and in order to defuse tensions and discuss the technical aspects of the second round of the presidential elections, UNITA in Huambo dispatched a high-powered delegation to Luanda on October 20, 1992. The said delegation consisted of UNITA Vice-President Jeremias Chitunda, Chief Negotiator Elias Salupeto Pena, Secretary-general Alicerces Mango and Administrative Secretary Eliseu Chimbili. However, these officials never returned to Huambo as they were among the over 20,000 UNITA supporters massacred<sup>30</sup> by MPLA Special Forces and armed civilians in the Angolan capital between October 31 and November 2, 1992.

The Luanda massacre started on October 31, 1992, barely 23 hours after the UNSC adopted resolution 785 (1992) extending the mandate of UNAVEM II to November 30, 1992, and threatening to “consider all appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations to secure implementation of the ‘Acordos de Paz’.”<sup>31</sup> This threat was also directed at UNITA only.

#### **4. The Second Angolan Civil War**

The massacre of UNITA peace negotiators and other supporters in Luanda was, in reality, what triggered the Second Angolan Civil War.

Thus, claims in several UNSC resolutions and statements that UNITA rejected the elections results and “resumed” the war are neither accurate nor justifiable.

Nonetheless, on November 12, 1992, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi formally confirmed in a letter<sup>32</sup> addressed to the UN Secretary-General that his organization accepted the legislative electoral results and was prepared to go for the second round of the presidential race.

However, ostensibly encouraged by a series of public condemnations of UNITA by the UNSC and the “expulsion of UNITA” from Luanda, MPLA forces and armed civilians continued to attack UNITA supporters in at least 10 other provisional capitals of the country.<sup>33</sup> As a consequence, tens of thousands of UNITA supporters, including 100 members of the Bakongo ethnic group<sup>34</sup>, were also decimated by marauding MPLA supporters between October 1992 and January 1993.

On November 25, 1992, in a detailed report to the UNSC, the Secretary-General attempted to identify the “root cause”<sup>35</sup> of the resumption of hostilities as the following: less than effective demobilization of forces and storage of weapons; the delay in creating the unified Angolan Armed Forces; the failure to re-establish effective central administration in many parts of the country; the delay in setting up a neutral police force as well as UN failure to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence, tolerance and respect between the two warring parties. The UN Secretary-General also urged the increasingly impatient and intolerant UNSC not to “despair of the Angolan peace process.”<sup>36</sup>

On November 30, 1992, the UNSC adopted another resolution<sup>37</sup> in which it, *inter alia*, extended the mandate of UNAVEM II to January 31, 1993, and demanded that the “two parties scrupulously observe the cease-fire, immediately stop all military confrontation and all offensive

troop movements.”<sup>38</sup> There was, however, no mention, whatsoever, of the murder in Luanda of the 4 high-ranking UNITA peace negotiators.

As if this were not bad enough, on January 29, 1993, the UNSC passed resolution 804 (1993) in which it, *inter alia*, “strongly” condemned the Movement of the Black Cockerel for the “persistent violations of the main provisions of the Acordos de Paz” and “withdrawal from the new Angolan armed forces and its seizure of provincial capitals and municipalities and the resumption of hostilities.”<sup>39</sup> However, in an apparent reference to the massacres of UNITA negotiators and supporters, but without mentioning the MPLA by name, the UNSC also “strongly” condemned “violations of international humanitarian law, in particular the attacks against the civilian population, including the extensive killings carried out by armed civilians.”<sup>40</sup>

Resolution 804 (1993) extended the mandate of UNAVEM II to April 30, 1993.

From thereon UNITA was repeatedly condemned in virtually all the consecutive UNSC resolutions and statements.<sup>41</sup> Today the Movement of the Galo Negro is also being held solely responsible for the collapse and failure of all UN peacekeeping operations in Angola<sup>42</sup> and systematically threatened with additional punitive actions.

A mediating body, which resorts to threats, coercion and ultimatums against one of the parties to a conflict, is bound to be mistrusted by the targeted party as a soccer team mistrusts a biased referee. Therefore the use of force threats ultimatums and similar actions have seriously compromised UN impartiality that was critical to its status as a mediator or referee.

Considering the fact that the entire UN philosophy is premised on international morality based on international human rights and humanitarian law, it is the Government of Angola, on behalf of the Angolan State, that has ratified international human rights and humanitarian treaties. Therefore it is the Government, in the first place, but not UNITA, which has the legal and moral obligation to observe such treaties.

It is this and other unbalanced approaches by particularly the UNSC that caused the international community to be perceived as being part of the problem, rather than the solution to the Angolan civil conflict. Such approaches are perceived to have systematically undermined mutual confidence between the warring Angolan parties.

#### **4.1. UNSC Imposes Sanctions against UNITA as Clinton Recognizes MPLA**

After supporting UNITA covertly for five years the US Government effected a complete about turn and, in spite of a very serious human rights situation in Angola, the Clinton Administration recognized the MPLA Government, for the first time, on May 19, 1993. On September 15, 1993, the UNSC passed resolution 864 (1993), imposing an arms and oil embargo on only UNITA. UNITA’s fight, which is a conflict not of an international character, was called a “threat to international peace and security.”<sup>43</sup>

This also became the first time in UN history that Chapter VII of the UN Charter was applied to a non-state entity.

On June 7, 1993, the MPLA Government, obviously encouraged by US recognition as well as UNSC sanctions against UNITA, unilaterally revoked the *Triple Zero Option* enshrined in the *Bicesse Accords* and, once again, began a massive arms build-up, which reached its peak in 1994.

One of the main reasons why nuclear war did not break out between the East and West during the Cold War was the fact that both sides had the military capability to destroy each other. This was deterrence. But in Angola when one side is allowed to acquire sophisticated weapons while the hands of other side are officially tied together, deterrence falls away and the well-armed side is bound to capitalize on this advantage.

Lack of deterrence in Angola is also being used to exterminate<sup>44</sup> with impunity the Ovimbundu, Bakongo, Chokwe and other rural peoples for their real or perceived political support for UNITA.

## **5. The Lusaka Protocol & Peace Process**

On November 20, 1994, the Lusaka Protocol provided for, among other things, the re-establishment of the 1991 cease-fire; unilateral quartering of all UNITA troops; unilateral withdrawal, disarmament and disbandment of all UNITA forces; as well as unilateral integration of UNITA generals into the MPLA-controlled armed forces; incorporation of UNITA troops into the police force; repatriation of all foreign mercenaries; the disarmament of the civilian population as well as the quartering and disarmament of the Government's rapid intervention police, notoriously known as "the Ninjas."

The major political aspects of this Protocol were the verification and monitoring by the UN; cessation of all hostile propaganda, establishment of an independent UN radio station; completion of the 1992 presidential electoral process; formation of a government of national unity and reconciliation; and, extension of State administration to UNITA-controlled areas.

Unlike the *Bicesse Accords* and later the provisions of paragraph 12 of UNSC resolution 976 (1995), the Lusaka Protocol does not impose a bilateral arms embargo on both the MPLA Government and UNITA.

### **5.1. UNSC Allows MPLA Arms Imports**

UNSC resolution 864 (1993) imposed an arms and oil embargo only on UNITA but allowed the MPLA Government to import arms and petroleum products throughout the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, as long as these came in "through named points of entry on a list supplied by the Government of Angola to the Secretary-General, who shall promptly notify the Member States of the United Nations."<sup>45</sup>

Furthermore, in terms of this Protocol, the US, Russia and Portugal, commonly known as the Troika of Observers, were supposed to act as guarantors of the Lusaka Peace Process. However, throughout the implementation of the Protocol, Russia and Portugal had undermined UNITA confidence and abused their official status as mediators by repeatedly signing military agreements<sup>46</sup> with, and supplying large amounts of offensive weapons to, the MPLA Government.

To date Russia<sup>47</sup> remains the MPLA's largest trading partner with respect to sophisticated weaponry. Angola, thanks to the MPLA, has a US\$6 billion debt<sup>48</sup> to Russia for weapons supplied in the 1980s.

The US, on the other hand, pressed the American mercenary outfits, the Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), to train<sup>49</sup> MPLA-controlled armed forces to fight UNITA guerrillas. The US is Angola's largest trading partner<sup>50</sup> in the sub-Saharan African region.

Partisan interests such as the commercial and financial interests of the Portugal, UK, Canada, Russia and US have also undermined the mediation efforts of the United Nations in Angola.

The Angolan Government also continued to systematically undermine both the peace accords and UNITA politically and militarily.

Internally, the extension of State administration to some 300 of 344 former UNITA-controlled areas was extensively used to erode UNITA's power base. In those areas, UNITA supporters were deliberately and consistently subjected to severe and massive human rights abuses<sup>51</sup>, including summary executions, torture, mass incarceration and enforced disappearances.

The arms build-up which the MPLA was allowed to have throughout the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, enabled the Government to isolate UNITA internationally. For example, the MPLA became involved in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the overthrow of the elected Pascal Lissouba government in Congo-Brazzaville as well as military incursions into Zambia<sup>52</sup> in order to isolate UNITA.

## **6. The Third Angolan Civil War**

The Third and present Angolan Civil War resumed<sup>53</sup> on December 5, 1998. On that date President Eduardo dos Santos, speaking at the opening of the IV Congress of his ruling MPLA, stated that "the only way" to lasting peace was the total elimination of Savimbi and his UNITA movement. Dos Santos also terminated the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) and put an end to the Lusaka Peace Process. MONUA observers, citing security reasons, withdrew<sup>54</sup> from all the remaining UNITA-held areas on December 6, 1998.

Moreover, just prior to the opening of the said Congress, MPLA Government forces launched a military attack on UNITA strongholds of Bailundo and Andulo.<sup>55</sup> Angola was, therefore, once again, plunged into a bloody civil war marked by a very serious human rights, humanitarian and security situation.

As in all other cases, the Third Angolan Civil War, which was soon exported to Namibia and, to some extent, Zambia<sup>56</sup> was preceded by an arms build-up by the MPLA. Such arms build-up, which reached its peak in 1999, was made possible by funds stolen from oil revenues.<sup>57</sup>

## **7. External Business Interests**

In March 2000, the Chairman of the Angola Sanctions Committee, Canada's UN Ambassador Robert Fowler, observed that Angola is "an enormously rich country, which in a couple of years was expected to pump more oil than Nigeria."<sup>58</sup> Fowler also noted that Angola had about 6 percent of the world's high quality and high-value diamonds.<sup>59</sup>

Clearly, Angola's vast oil and diamond resources are part of the problem. External business rivalry for oil and mining resources in Africa has been a consistent exacerbating factor for civil conflicts.<sup>60</sup>

The chaotic war situation and instability created a perfect environment and best opportunity for especially unscrupulous Western multinational oil and banking corporations, as well as diamond mining mercenary companies, to reap enormous profits without State control. The involvement of these corporations and companies in fueling the civil conflicts in Africa is well documented. According to the Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR) based in Cape Town, South Africa:

*“African post-colonial violence is invariably presented to the outside world as if it was the ‘natural’ condition for a ‘barbarous’ continent. The business rivals have the power to plant their stories in the media deflecting attention from the possibility that it is the multinational actors who, by intriguing with local political interests, stir up much of the violence themselves.”<sup>61</sup>*

The fact that the Angolan conflict is almost exclusively blamed on UNITA by the UNSC and certain influential Western governments and certain sections of the international media appears to confirm the above observation by the CCR.

### **7.1. The Involvement of Western Multinational Corporations**

Global Witness (GW), a British-based human rights organization, has demonstrated, in finer detail, how Western multinational oil and banking corporations and certain foreign governments, in complicity with the Angolan Government, have been involved in fueling the Angolan conflict. Said GW:

*“The international oil companies which are profiting from the Angolan people’s main natural resource, the international banks which arranged short-term loans at exorbitant interest rates and the national governments which assist such business arrangements must accept their responsibility... If not, they must accept that they are complicit in this situation. Collectively, they are the source of the vast disappearing revenues, which are the driving force behind the continuation of war.”<sup>62</sup>*

In order to correct this situation GW recommended that “international commercial banks which have provided vast loans that have been used” by the Angolan Government to “purchase weapons, often through mafia-style individuals and companies... should desist in providing further loans.”<sup>63</sup>

The views of GW are in congruence with this observation by Human Rights Watch (HRW):

*“... The Angolan Government has used oil revenues to finance covert arms purchases that undermined the spirit of the Lusaka Peace Accords. The arms are being used to continue a vicious civil war in which hundreds of thousands of civilians have lost their lives over the last decade and nearly 10 percent of the population were displaced by the renewed conflict.”<sup>64</sup>*

HRW also reported that the Angolan Government during 1998 used about US\$870 million of funds that had been generated from signature bonus payments on oil exploration and offshore concession blocks to acquire sophisticated weapons.<sup>65</sup> The international human rights body wrote that, on aggregate, oil revenues comprise over 90 percent of Angola’s exports, between 70 and 90 percent of government income from 1994-1999.<sup>66</sup>

### **7.2. The Involvement of Multinational Mercenary Companies**

The involvement of diamond mining mercenary firms, such as Executive Outcomes (South Africa), Sandline International (UK), DiamondWorks (Canada) in fueling civil conflicts is also well documented<sup>67</sup> in conflict-stricken and mineral rich countries such as Angola, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo and Papua New Guinea. Many of these firms are said to have close ties<sup>68</sup> with multinational oil and mineral exploration corporations, which provide additional

funding and political contacts for such firms.<sup>69</sup> In 1997 DiamondWorks became Canada's largest producer of diamonds.<sup>70</sup>

The UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries had this observation to make about the involvement of mercenaries in fueling conflicts:

*“The aggravating factor is that their participation is linked to the bloodiest aspects of a conflict and to crimes against human rights. Moreover, the financial considerations and desire for illicit gain through looting which are associated with their participation may be decisive in prolonging the conflict. The mercenary's interest lies not in peace and reconciliation but in war, since that is his business and his livelihood.”<sup>71</sup>*

There have been credible reports that the MPLA Government assisted by Portuguese, Brazilian, Israeli and Russian mercenaries had indiscriminately used chemical cluster, napalm, fuel-air-explosive and other bombs<sup>72</sup> against civilian targets resulting in massacres in UNITA-controlled areas in the central highlands and northwestern parts of the country.

The UN Special Rapporteur also made this observation regarding the role of Executive Outcomes (EO) mercenaries in fueling the civil conflict in Sierra Leone:

*“In recruiting mercenaries, Executive Outcomes is said to work through a network of security companies operating in various countries, soldiers of fortune and intelligence circles. Its work in Sierra Leone is said to involve the following activities: training of officers and other ranks; reconnaissance and aerial photography; strategic planning; training in the use new military equipment; advising on arms purchases; devising psychological campaigns aimed at creating panic among the civilian population and discrediting the leaders of the RUF, etc.”<sup>73</sup>*

Ample evidence also shows that the involvement of mercenary companies in the Angolan conflict began in early 1993. At the time the MPLA Government signed a US\$140 million contract<sup>74</sup> with EO in order to fight UNITA forces. EO and other mercenary troops were held responsible for indiscriminate killings, including massacres of civilians in the central highlands and the northwestern regions of Angola, including at Soyo<sup>75</sup> during 1993.

Coincidentally, this is also the time when the UNSC, for the first time in UN history, applied the provisions of Chapter VII on a non-State actor, i.e. UNITA.

## **8. The UNSC's Anti-UNITA Sanctions Regime**

The sanctions regime imposed on UNITA is centered on UNSC resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 (1997), 1173 (1998) and 1295 (2000). The measures at issue are: an embargo on arms and petroleum and petroleum products; banning travel by all senior officials of UNITA and the adult members of their immediate families; and imposition of an embargo on diamonds from UNITA controlled areas and a freeze on UNITA bank accounts and other financial assets; as well as tightening the existing the sanctions regime, respectively.

For all practical purposes, the sanctions regime and the military campaigns by the MPLA government appear to be designed to destroy UNITA as an organization. For example, the report of the Angola Sanctions Committee recommends, *inter alia*, the “immediate expulsion of those persons found still to be actively engaged in UNITA's military or political affairs” and that the

list of “senior UNITA officials” should be “expanded to include foreign individuals closely collaborating with UNITA and providing assistance.”<sup>76</sup>

Nonetheless, the destruction of a ‘national, ethnic, racial or religious’, ‘any stable and permanent group’ or ‘political or social group’ is classified in both the 1998 Rome Statute and the Genocide Convention of 1948 as genocide and or a crime against humanity.<sup>77</sup> Isn’t UNITA such a group?

UNSC sanctions have been imposed on the premise that UNITA was solely to blame for the continued conflict in Angola. However, the involvement of certain Western governments, multinational oil and banking corporations as well as mercenary organizations clearly shows that UNITA cannot reasonably be held solely responsible for the continued conflict in Angola.

Furthermore, sanctions and other punitive actions by the UNSC have proved to be counter-productive. As had been clearly demonstrated in the cases of Cuba, Libya, Iraq, Bosnian Serbs and Yugoslavia such measures only help to unify not divide or deter those who are fighting for their survival and who are determined to die for their cause.

## **9. Human Rights Imperatives**

Astonishingly, human rights issues do not feature prominently in the Alvor Agreement, the Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka Protocol. These are kept as subtext in the Lusaka Protocol, having been mentioned only as a commitment to general principles of human rights in the protocol’s annexes on national reconciliation. The human rights abuses perpetrated on mass scale against UNITA supporters were neither promptly investigated nor publicly denounced by the UN and certain Western nations.

It must be pointed out that the process of transition to Angolan independence from Portugal on November 11, 1975, brought very little or no meaningful change to the indigenous African population. It has not led to the end of dictatorial rule marked by lack of transparency and accountability, glaring income disparities along racial lines, widespread and systematic human rights abuses, absence of an independent judiciary, disrespect for the rule of law, economic mismanagement and pandemic corruption. It had also left virtually intact the *status quo ante* of deep-rooted ethnic hatred and the urban-rural divide.

Herein also lies the source of the recurrence and continuation of the violent civil conflict in Angola.

According to Angola’s present human development indicators<sup>78</sup>, the life expectancy is 42 years, 83 percent of the population lives in absolute poverty, 76 percent are without access to healthcare and the unemployment rate is 80 percent. This state of affairs mostly afflicts the very same groups who were previously marginalized during the Portuguese colonialist period.

Severe suppression of, and restrictions on, the right to freedom of opinion and expression, association and assembly in Angola is also well documented. This includes systematic persecution of media workers. It is no wonder that President Eduardo dos Santos has recently been classified as one of the world’s 10 worst enemies of the press.<sup>79</sup> On February 17, 2000, the European Parliament passed a resolution deploring the state of press freedom in Angola.<sup>80</sup>

The human rights situation is no better along Namibia’s northeastern border. Here unprecedented gross and systematic abuses perpetrated by Namibian and Angolan forces have been occurring since November 1999, after Angolan armed forces were allowed to fight UNITA from Namibian

soil.<sup>81</sup> These abuses include a series of massacres<sup>82</sup>, transfers of large numbers of people, enforced disappearances, torture and mutilation; recruitment of mercenaries<sup>83</sup> and child soldiers<sup>84</sup> as well as anti-personnel landmines planted by Angolan Special Forces.<sup>85</sup>

Such abuses are deliberately and systematically directed particularly against the Ovimbundu<sup>86</sup> and other oppressed peoples for their real or perceived support of UNITA while the international community maintains its silence about them.

Hence, the human rights situation in Angola deserves to be described as a consistent pattern of gross and systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This state of affairs warrants an urgent investigation by a UN special rapporteur.

## **10. Struggle for the Right to Self-Determination**

During its 52<sup>nd</sup> session, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution<sup>87</sup> reaffirming the importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination, as a fundamental condition for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights and for the preservation and promotion of such rights. The right of peoples to self-determination is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and embodied in the International Covenants on Human Rights as well as the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.<sup>88</sup>

Considering the poor management of the process of transition to independence as well as the extent to which the governments of Brazil, Canada, Portugal, Russia, US and UK and multinational oil and banking corporations as well as mercenary companies are involved in the Angolan conflict on the side of the Government, UNITA should be considered as a national liberation movement struggling against neocolonial domination and foreign intervention.

Moreover, Angola is one of a few sub-Sahara African countries where political and military power vests in an ethnic and racial minority. Rwanda, Burundi and, to a certain extent, Kenya are the others. However, unlike Angola, Rwanda and Burundi, Kenya has a degree of homogeneousness with respect to the Kiswahili language.

During the colonial era, African liberation movements fighting for the right to self-determination enjoyed the support of the international community. Specifically, peoples fighting for self-determination received various support: humanitarian, moral, financial and even military support from Western and Eastern countries alike. Said the UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries:

*“The international community should give further thought to the background and habitual course of such conflicts, and support African efforts to secure rapid, effective agreements guaranteeing the right to self-determination, observance of human rights, democracy and development for all peoples who, despite the attainment of independence some years ago, are unable to find peace with justice and development, mainly because of violence, foreign interests and armed conflicts.”<sup>89</sup>*

Yet, the Angolan Government, despite its ignominious human rights record, is called “legitimate” and enjoys the support of especially the Clinton Administration and certain other influential permanent members of the UNSC.

## **IV. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS**



## **1. On Internal & External Factors**

The Angolan civil war is characterized by virtually all the structural and proximate causes of conflict in Africa as identified by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his report of April 16, 1998, as submitted Security Council. Basically, it is an ethnic conflict exacerbated, prolonged and exploited by disparate commercial, financial and other interests of certain influential permanent Member States of the UN Security Council.

As in numerous sub-Sahara African nations, political organizations in Angola are either ethnically or regionally based. However, in Angola political and military power vests in an ethnic and racial minority.

The Government of Angola, with the support of certain permanent members of the UNSC, has the political and military power. Whereas, UNITA under Jonas Savimbi, has a very strong political support from the historically marginalized indigenous African peoples. Considering the level of politicized ethnicity in Angola, like elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, punitive actions taken against UNITA and Savimbi are collectively perceived as acts of hostility against the oppressed peoples of Angola, in general, and the Ovimbundu people, in particular.

Hence, the international community risks to be seen as siding with one ethno-cultural and social group against the other.

A mediating body which targets one of the parties to a conflict by resorting to punitive actions or threats and ultimatums is bound to be mistrusted by the targeted party as a soccer team mistrusts a biased referee.

Economic and similar punitive actions have largely proved to be counter-productive. As it had been clearly demonstrated in the cases of Cuba, Libya, Iraq, Bosnian Serbs and Yugoslavia, sanctions and other punitive measures had only helped to unify, not to divide those nations. Hence, the imposition of sanctions against UNITA has not only undermined UNITA's confidence in the UNSC but also has also heightened the perception of collective persecution and exacerbated a sense of ethno-cultural and economic deprivation. Such persecution and deprivation are among the structural root and proximate causes of the Angolan civil conflict in the first place.

It appears that the UNSC lacks a good grasp of the structural root causes and exacerbating and triggering factors of the Angolan conflict and therefore has been rushing the peace processes in that country. For example, the Lusaka Peace Process was concluded under duress and has a scant value in the absence of a genuine commitment to the promotion of respect for human rights, national reconciliation, sustainable economic development and durable peace in Angola.

The UNSC has been behaving like a physician selectively treating the symptoms, but not diagnosing the root causes, of the Angolan disease. The ethno-cultural and psycho-political dynamics of the Angolan civil war urgently requires an unequivocal confidence-building approach by an impartial mediator.

To promote and encourage universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all was one of the basic objectives for which the UN was founded in 1945. The situation in Angola, for which the Angolan Government is legally and morally held responsible in terms of international law, reveals a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested infractions of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Although the Government of Angola is a State Party to over 20 international human rights treaties, 6 of which have regular reporting requirements, none of these requirements have so far been complied with. Nonetheless, the Government of Angola, despite its ignominious human rights record, is called “legitimate” and enjoys the support of especially the Clinton Administration and certain other influential permanent members of the UNSC.

The Government of Angola, analogous to apartheid South Africa, has become the main destabilizing agent in the sub-Saharan African region. It is this status that poses a real threat to international peace and security.

## **2. On the former Cold War Protagonists**

Given the history of the Angolan civil war the role the Troika of Observers/Mediators themselves have played in undermining the *Bicesse Accords* and the Lusaka Peace Process, the international community must question the true motivations of these governments.

It has since also become clear that during the Cold War era certain Western nations abused the UN’s human rights discourse to rally international support for their own exclusive national interests. This explains why the US and the UK, among others, managed to support “anti-Communist” African despots such as Idi Amin (Uganda), Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire) and others.

On the other hand, the Soviet Russians used the UN’s right to self-determination discourse to rally international support for any “anti-Imperialist” leaders in order to fight against their Western adversaries. Russia also supported African dictators such as Mohammed Siyad Barre (Somalia), Mengistu Haile Mariam (Ethiopia), Samora Machel (Mozambique) and Eduardo dos Santos (Angola).

In both cases the real victims were democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, peace and sustainable human development in so many African countries.

Portugal, Russia, UK and US are now regarding the MPLA Government as “legitimate.” Please note, they are not saying that the Government is democratic, accountable or transparent or respects the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the entire Angolan people. Democratic governance, accountability, transparency and respect for human rights are supposed to be among the key characteristics of any legitimate government. These, however, have never existed in MPLA-ruled Angola.

## **3. On UNSC ‘Conflict’ Diamond’ Sanctions**

The UNSC has taken the position that the sale of “illicit” diamonds by UNITA is prohibited because it fuels the civil war in Angola. However, the sale of oil and diamonds by the Angolan Government, one of the two parties to the conflict, as well as the role played by certain foreign governments, multinational oil and banking corporations as well as mercenary companies is apparently regarded as “legal.” Sufficient proof, however, does exist that funds generated from such sales are also used by the Angolan Government to buy offensive arms that fuel the civil conflict.

If the UNSC really wants to stop the war, why don’t they just stop the flow of arms to either side, rather than small easily concealable diamonds? Why are Brazil, Portugal and Russia and other

arms traders allowed by the UNSC to supply arms to the Angolan government thereby fueling the war in Angola?

Furthermore, certain Western governments and NGOs have now embarked on a worldwide campaign<sup>90</sup> against the use of so-called “blood” or “conflict” diamonds by only “rebel movements” in Africa. Nevertheless, it is also a known fact that high-ranking government officials in Africa are themselves deeply involved in “conflict” diamonds for personal gain, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Angola. This creates a false impression that diamonds become only “bloody” or “conflict” when the so-called rebel movements acquire them. Or does this mean that all governments in Africa have, all of a sudden, become democratic, accountable, transparent and legitimate, such that the right of peoples to self-determination is no longer valued?

The “blood diamonds” story therefore could be a deliberate effort by certain Western governments and NGOs aimed at diverting international attention from the moral support for universal realization of the inalienable right of oppressed peoples to self-determination. Legitimate national liberation movements should just not be deliberately vilified and stigmatized as “rebel groups” or even “terrorists” as is the case in Angola.

Hence, the UNITA diamond sanctions regime could be part of an intentional scape-goating campaign by an assortment of powerful Western governments, multinational oil and banking corporations as well as mercenary companies to prolong the conflict for their own commercial and financial interests at the expense of the Angolan people. These entities may also be doing so out of fear that if political power in Angola were to vest in the hands of the indigenous Angolan people, the chance is good that the scandalous plundering of that country’s resources as alleged by Global Witness would come to an end.

The scandal involved in the oil exploration and banking operations in Angola appear to be of massive proportions such that it could lead to the exposure of certain high-ranking officials in influential Western nations, leading to a leadership and financial crisis in those countries or even in the whole world.

Therefore the involvement of Western governments, multinational oil and banking corporations and mercenary organizations from the same countries smacks of an international conspiracy. Is Canadian Ambassador Robert Fowler, for example, aware that DiamondWorks, a Canadian mercenary outfit with deep involvement in “conflict” diamond mining in Angola, has become the largest diamond producer in Canada?

#### **4. On Anti-Savimbi Campaign**

The international community is advocating total isolation of Savimbi and UNITA, including forced exile or altogether elimination by military methods.<sup>91</sup> It is shocking to hear from certain major Western democracies that forced exile or expulsion of UNITA supporters and the suppression of the right to freedom of expression and opinion (in respect of UNITA representatives in several Western countries) are, after all, permissible. Moreover, it makes no sense for Western nations to censure the Angolan Government for suppressing the right to freedom of expression, opinion and press in Angola, while UNITA supporters are muzzled in those Western countries.

Equally disturbing and morally reprehensible is the strategy by the Angolan Government to physically eliminate UNITA leaders, including Dr. Jonas Savimbi. Unfortunately, such strategy

whereby UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi should be “targeted”<sup>92</sup> apparently enjoys the support certain influential members of the UNSC.

The massacre of UNITA peace negotiators in Luanda on November 2, 1992, triggered the resumption of the conflict, not the “rejection” of the electoral results by UNITA.

It is also often claimed that Dr. Savimbi cannot be regarded as valid interlocutor in the Peace Process allegedly because he has violated the Bicesse Accords and “went back to the bush.”<sup>93</sup>

Let us assume, for a moment, that this claim was true. How many agreements or UNSC resolutions were said to have been violated by the State of Israel vis-à-vis the rights of the Palestinians? Nonetheless, peace talks between the Israelis and the Arabs are still fostered, perhaps since 1967. The same can be said of Northern Ireland where parties to the Protestant-Catholic conflict are being encouraged to achieve lasting peace through dialogue. Why should Angola be an exception? Surely what is good for the goose should also be good for the gander?

There is no question that UNITA leader Savimbi represents a large section of the Angolan population, i.e. 40 percent as opposed to 49 percent for President dos Santos, if the 1992 elections are anything to go by. Just imagine how the US Democrats or British Labor Party supporters would feel if a foreign power were to call for the “targeting” or summary removal of President Bill Clinton or Prime Minister Tony Blair.

If the structural root and proximate causes of the Angolan civil war were used as a pointer, to expect UNITA to surrender to the ethnic and racial minority MPLA government would be tantamount to forcing the Chechens, Kosovars, Greek Cypriots, Palestinians and the Hutus to surrender to the Russians, Serbs, Turk Cypriots, Israelis and Tutsis, respectively.

## **V. RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Bicesse Accords of May 31, 1991, read together with the provisions of paragraph 12 of UNSC resolution 976 (1995) should continue to be the basic framework in accordance with which the Angolan conflict could be ended.

From the preceding chapters it becomes quite clear that the international community has repeatedly failed to build requisite mutual confidence between the warring parties in Angola. The EU should urgently help create such environment in order to end the conflict and human rights abuses there.

To that effect the EU should set up an *ad hoc* task force to identify the structural and proximate causes as well as closely monitor the human rights, humanitarian and security situation in Angola. In so doing, the EU should liaize with local human rights organizations, the media and ecumenical bodies. This is needed in order to give practical effect to the pursuit of EU objectives as set out in Article 1 (c) and (d) of its Common Position on Angola of June 8, 2000.

The EU should also continue to be deeply committed to a peaceful political solution to the conflict in Angola and should make every effort to achieve that objective.

Particularly, the EU should support a Track Two-mediation exercise in Angola, along the lines of the Saint Egidio effort, which led to the successful resolution of the Mozambican conflict. The UN, the EU and the OAU should make their good offices available for this purpose.

The international community should impose a comprehensive and complete arms embargo on both the MPLA Government and UNITA as envisaged in the Bicesse Accords read together with the provisions of paragraph 12 of UNSC resolution 976 (1995) of February 8, 1995.

From Article (1) of the EU's Common Position as adopted at Feira, one of the EU objectives is to "contribute to a policy of national reconciliation in Angola through the promotion of a culture of tolerance and dialogue and all those within UNITA and other political parties who are truly committed to peace and unequivocally demonstrate their will to abide by the rules enshrined in the Lusaka Protocol and democratic principles."

While such objective could be commendable, it reinforces the exclusionist position already being held and pursued by the MPLA Government with active support from US, UK and Canada that, among other things, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi should be sidelined as valid interlocutor allegedly because he has violated certain provisions of the Bicesse Accords. Moreover, this position does not make sense since peace needs to be made by and between the two warring parties. As United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan once put it:

*"You make peace with enemies."*<sup>94</sup>

The EU Common Position 97/356/CFSP adopted in 1997 concerning conflict prevention and resolution in Africa should therefore be centered and based on a policy of strict impartiality vis-a-vis all the warring parties. This is unquestionably necessary in order to build mutual confidence between the warring parties in Angola.

The EU should also become actively involved in preventing further human rights abuses. Gross human rights abuses perpetrated by the Government and UNITA should be left to a national truth and reconciliation commission to be established by the Angolan Parliament to be set up after the successful implementation of the envisaged new peace agreement. The international community should, however, not tolerate any further infractions of human rights from any quarter in Angola.

On June 8, 2000, at Feira, Portugal the EU adopted a Common Position on Angola in which it was realistically noted "certain provisions of (the EU Common Position of 1995) are obsolete and require updating." It is therefore recommended that a similar position should be adopted and similar updating should be undertaken vis-a-vis certain contradictions between the Lusaka Protocol and its Annexes. For example:

- (i) While the *Bicesse Accords* read together with the provisions of paragraph 12 of UNSC Resolution 976 (1995) impose a comprehensive arms embargo on all stakeholders, UNSC resolution 864 (1993) allows the MPLA Government to acquire sophisticated offensive weapons and imposes an arms embargo exclusively on UNITA. Yet, the *Bicesse Accords* and UNSC Resolution 864 (1993) are annexes to the Lusaka Protocol.
- (ii) Whereas the *Bicesse Accords* make provision for a comprehensive bilateral disarmament, quartering, demobilization and integration of both Government and UNITA troops, the Lusaka Protocol makes provision for the disarmament, quartering, demobilization and integration of only UNITA forces.

It is therefore recommended that the Lusaka Protocol be revised and brought in line with the *Bicesse Accords* read together with the provisions of paragraph 12 of the UNSC resolution 976 (1995).

Once confidence has been built and new peace agreement has been reached between the two parties, a neutral peacekeeping and confidence-building multinational force should go into Angola to effect total disarmament and demobilization of both Government and UNITA forces. This should be followed by the formation of a transitional government of national unity as foreseen in the *Alvor Agreement* and the *Bicesse Accords*.

It is recommended such multinational force should take over the portfolios of defense, security, and finance (finance through the IMF), for a period of, say, five years, and thereafter elections should then be held.

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