"Zionist-Nazi Collaboration" Refuted

Lenni Brenner's Trickery Exposed

By LOUIS HARAP

The anti-Israel, anti-Zionist Left press these days has published reviews of and allusions to a recent book that is designed to support an anti-Israel position. Lenni Brenner's Zionism in the Age of Dictators (Lawrence Hill and Co., Westport, Conn., 1983, 277 pages, indexed, $7.95 paper) has deeply impressed these reviewers and letter-writers as a scholarly and well-documented demonstration of the "racist" character of Zionism and of the Zionist movement's "collaboration" with Nazism. The book was favorably reviewed in Izvestia under the title, "Zionist Collaborationists: A Journalist Unmasks Dirty Deal with Nazi Chiefs." Indeed, it requires a great deal of alertness to avoid being taken in by the show of documentation in this book, one of the trickiest, most plausible bits of special pleading I have ever encountered.

Nearly all the several hundred references in the book are to sources in English. The reason, the author explains, is that "the reader may verify the research apparatus relied upon." But is this book the "scrupulously researched polemic against Jewish nationalism," as Daniel Lazare, a regular contributor to In These Times, characterized it (Dec. 23, 1983), though he wisely added, "so far as I can tell"? We shall see what happens to this scrupulosity if one accepts Brenner's invitation to verify his research.

Brenner's intense polemic tries to show that the Zionist movement was not at all interested in rescue of Jews from the Holocaust and even "collaborated" with the Nazis. Although he singles out some individual Zionists for heroic rescue efforts, he passes totally negative judgment on nearly all Zionists except, at certain times, the Revisionists, the extreme rightwing of the Zionist movement, which became a reservoir for Jewish terrorism in Palestine and was finally voted into power in Israel in 1977. This does not mean that Brenner himself was a Revisionist. On the contrary, he is a self-professed "independent Trotskyist" and a bitter enemy of the State of Israel and of Zionism. His approval of Revisionists extends only to what he regards as their "militant" efforts toward rescue in the 1940s but he exposes the fascist tendencies and connections among them.

Brenner explores the response of Zionism in Germany to Nazism more than in any other place since German Jews were for years in the eye of the Nazi storm and bore the brunt of Nazism's plans for the Jews. But he also briefly discusses the response of the Zionists in Austria, Poland, Central Europe and other parts of the world. He gives on the whole unfriendly attention to the rescue work of U.S. Zionists.

What Brenner has in effect done in this book is to stack the case against the Zionist movement. He largely ig-
nores relevant and indeed essential aspects of the Jewish situation during the Nazi period in order to make out the most negative case. One does not have to be a Zionist to criticize the fallaciousness of such treatment of history.

To take one of the most obvious instances — nowhere does he seem to recognize as a form of rescue the Zionist promotion of emigration to Palestine from Nazi Germany, since for Brenner Zionism is indifferent to rescue. Brenner does not wish to contaminate the mind of the reader with the notion that Chaim Weizmann ever thought about saving Jews. Even in a passage from Nahum Goldmann’s autobiography quoted by Brenner, Nahum Goldmann was critical of Weizmann’s exclusive preoccupation with Palestine. But Goldmann nevertheless added that Weizmann “did take an interest in saving Jews in the first years of Nazism” (p. 16).*

Brenner uses two methods to make a case for Zionist “collaboration” — selective quotation and snide characterization. Totally absent is any consideration of the murderous pressures under which German Jews were operating. The centerpiece of Brenner’s charge is a memorandum which the Zionist Federation of Germany sent to the Nazis on June 21, 1933. This is mentioned by Joachim Prinz, then a young leader of German Zionism who had recently left Germany, in an article, “Zionism under the Nazi Government.” Originally published in The New Palestine, the article was reprinted in the Nov., 1937 issue of the London Young Zionist, which is Brenner’s source. The memorandum asks the Nazis for a meeting to work out a modus vivendi with German Zionism. Brenner writes that this document “remained buried until 1962” (p. 48), even though Prinz had already discussed it a quarter of a century earlier. Brenner waxes ironic at Prinz’s description of this document’s tone as one of “pride” and “dignity” that addressed the Nazis, as phrased by Brenner, “very politely.” Did Brenner think it preferable to address the Nazi bullies uncivilly?

The meeting was requested, Prinz wrote, to consider “the new status of German Jewry” (Prinz, p. 18). The memorandum further noted the common aim of Zionism and Nazism to “solve” the Jewish Question (the “Final Solution” had not yet been enunciated), even though, said the document, the Zionists recognized that the Nazis were a government “fundamentally hostile to Jews” (Brenner, p. 49). There is much in this document with which non-Zionists or even some Zionists might disagree. But if we keep in mind the Zionist aim to promote emigration to Palestine, this document was one step in the direction of rescue.

Prinz goes on in his article to report that no reply was ever received. “The Nazi attitude toward the Zionists,” Prinz goes on, “was only a facade. In reality Zionists were and are miserably treated. . . . In brief, the seeming pro-Zionist attitude of the German Government is not an expression of, and should not be confused with, cooperation on the part of one side or the other” (Prinz, pages 18-19). Of course Brenner does not quote this part of Prinz’s article.

Under strong pressure from the Zionists and other German Jewish organizations, the World Zionist Congress opposed a boycott of the Nazis, as did the organizations of wealthy U.S. Jews, the American Jewish

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* I wish to thank Carol Jochnowitz for providing me with the full texts of some of the sources from which Brenner quotes.
Committee and the B’nai B’rith, and also the Board of Deputies of British Jews for their own quietist reasons. 1930s led Jewish efforts to boycott as did the American Jewish Congress intermittently, the Jewish War Veterans, the Jewish Labor Committee and the Jewish Left and Communists. Not all Zionists agreed with the anti-boycott position, but it finally prevailed. One can understand the German Jews’ fear of reprisals from the boycott, but this writer must agree that the acquiescence of German Zionists urging upon world Jewry to reject the boycott should not have been heeded. On the other hand, it must be admitted that German Jewish rejection of the boycott did help facilitate emigration.

Of greater importance, however, was the Ha’avura, the Trade Transfer agreement between the Nazis and the Jewish Agency, with British acquiescence. Under it wealthy German Jews could deposit from one to four thousand British pounds in German banks; this money would purchase agricultural equipment and other commodities in Germany which were then shipped to Palestine; the German Jewish participants would then be admitted to Palestine over and above the quota. When the goods were sold in Palestine, emigrants would then reclaim their money.

The deal was finally signed in June, 1933, by the young Labor Zionist leader Chaim Arlosoroff, one of the leading advocates of Arab-Jewish rapprochement. Brenner reports that 16,529 German Jews entered above quota by this deal and that the capital acquired thus by the Palestinian economy was $40,419,000, which, writes Brenner, “generated a boom” there, comprising “some 60% of all capital invested in Palestine” between 1933 and 1939 (Brenner, p. 65). Thus, not only were 16,529 more Jews enabled to emigrate, but Palestine itself was placed in a better position to absorb additional emigrants through its enlarged economy.

Brenner sneeringly refers to these emigrants as “capitalists” and, as if such Jews were not worthy of rescue, coldly adds that they were an “additional source of immigrants, as well as an economic harvest for Zionism” (p. 65). Such arrangements led to charges of “collaboration.” For German Jews, however, the prospect of emigration through the Zionists caused the number of Zionists, heretofore a small minority of German Jews, to swell. The ensuing emigration in effect helped thwart Hitler’s genocidal plans by removing thousands of Jews from the Reich.

Many Jews outside of Germany were distressed by such arrangements. In Sept., 1933, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise cried out in disapproval, “I think I speak the minds of Jews everywhere when I say we hold in abhorrence any Jew, whether in or out of Palestine, who undertakes to make any commercial arrangements with the Nazi government for any reason whatsoever” (p. 67). But not all Zionists felt this way. Joachim Prinz, in his article cited above and quoted by Brenner, makes a case against any charge of “collaboration.” When the full text of the article is examined, it turns out to convey the opposite meaning to that given to it by Brenner. Prinz wrote, and Brenner quotes him (on p. 88) as follows: “It was morally disturbing to seem to be considered as the favored children of the Nazi Government, particularly when it dissolved the anti-Zionist youth groups, and seemed in other ways to prefer the Zionists. The Nazis asked for a ‘more Zionist behavior’” (Prinz, p. 18, emphasis added). Prinz couched his concern in conditional terms: the Zionists “seemed to be considered,” the Nazis “seemed . . . to prefer the
Zionists.” In other words, Prinz is emphasizing that he was disturbed at what other people thought about Zionist behavior toward the Nazis, which he knew to be erroneous from his own experience. He knew in fact that Zionists were badly treated and he finally realized, after no reply came to their memorandum, that “the only attitude of the German Government toward Jews was one of humiliation, degradation and the spirit of the Stuermer” (Prinz, p. 18). He concludes that “the seeming pro-Zionist attitude of the German Government is not an expression of, and should not be confused with, cooperation on the part of one side or the other” (Prinz, p. 19).

Brenner does not, of course, pay any attention to this passage, which conveys the opposite to the impression left by his earlier quotation on being “morally disturbed.”

Another quotation used by Brenner to shore up his charge of collaboration comes from the Congress Bulletin, organ of the American Jewish Congress, for Jan. 24, 1936. Brenner quotes the following passage from the editorial: “Hitlerism is Satan’s nationalism. The determination to rid the German national body of the Jewish element, however, led Hitlerism to discover its ‘kinship’ with Zionism, the Jewish nationalism of liberation. Therefore Zionism became the only other party legalized in the Reich, the Zionist flag the only other flag permitted to fly in Nazi-land. It was a painful distinction for Zionism to be singled out for favors and privileges by its Satanic counterpart” (Brenner, pages 85-86; Bulletin, p. 2). But when the entire editorial is read, it becomes clear that the Bulletin is not here criticizing Zionism but rather the “kinship” forced upon Zionism. The Zionists were thereby permitted to pursue emigration, that is, rescue. But does this compulsory “kinship” imply collaboration?

The Bulletin is far from arguing this in the editorial. On the contrary, it goes on to show two things: first, where real Jewish collaboration took place; and second, Zionist resistance to collaboration. At that time in Germany there was a classic Jewish collaborationist, Georg Kareski. This Jewish Quisling was a banker, an adherent of the Catholic Center Party and leader of the German Revisionists in 1933. In Nazi fashion he attempted a putsch to take over the Berlin Jewish Center, and when that failed he organized the “Jewish State Party” as the Jewish counterpart of the Nazi Party. In 1937 he was implicated in a bank scandal and had to flee to Haifa, where some German Jews spotted him on the streets and ran after him until he had to be rescued by the police. This was the man whom the Nazis tried to foist on the Jews as a leader to carry out their plans for the Jews.

When the Nazis promulgated the Nuremberg Laws in 1935, says the Bulletin editorial, “the Nazis had imposed on the Jews . . . the cultural dictatorship of Georg Kareski.” But the Zionist Federation of Germany demanded that it be given “full jurisdiction” over Jewish cultural life, an “open defiance” of the Nazis’ Jew, Kareski. The journal adds that Kareski was “the Jew who made Hitlerism his Jewish national faith” and was “entrusted with implementing the Nazi-made cultural autonomy for Jews.” If the Zionist Federation were to “submit to his dictatorship,” the Bulletin continues, “it would indirectly subscribe to the Kareski-Goebbels-Hinkel interpretation of Zionism. It would do so under duress . . . . The demand for full jurisdiction [emphasis in original] over Jewish matters carries the daring implication that no Kareski patronage is acceptable,”
which is a display of "courage and determination."

Thus the passage which Brenner quotes to demonstrate collaboration turns out, when the entire context is examined, to show just the opposite — resistance by the Zionist Federation to the Nazis’ real collaborator, Kareski. Joachim Prinz, too, in the 1937 article cited above, pays his respects to Kareski, who had played a "devilish role in Germany." The newspaper edited by Kareski, adds Prinz, is "written in the style of the Angriff" (Goebbels' newspaper) (Prinz, p. 19).

Zionists made their mistakes during this terrible period, like everyone else. Brenner, however, 50 years later, is full of advice for the Zionists of the 1920s and 1930s. He quotes

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from the Prinz article as warning in 1932 of dangers of "an anti-Semitic totalitarian regime." Then Brenner goes on to minimize Zionist warnings (p. 29)! But in fact, in the same article of 1937, Prinz writes how from 1918 onward "official Jewry was against us," the German Zionists. "We could do nothing but warn" in the face of increasing anti-Semitic propaganda and overt action. In 1930, Prinz himself, he writes, enraged a German Jewish audience by warning against "the Nazis as coming rulers of Germany" (Prinz, pages 17-18).

Brenner is anxious to show that the then leader of German Zionism, Kurt Blumenfeld, was passive in the face of

Nazism. But Walter Laqueur writes in his History of Zionism that in 1932 "Blumenfeld had played Cassandra for a long time," and that Weizmann for a long time chided him not to make "such dire predictions." Weizmann was so disturbed by Blumenfeld's warnings that he set up an alternative Zionist center in Germany to offset Blumenfeld's "ultra-pessimistic views" (Laqueur, p. 499).

It is true that the German Zionists agitated in the German Jewish community and to the Central Union of Citizens of Jewish Faith, the thoroughly assimilationist organization of the majority of German Jews, to abandon their assimilationist views. Against their insistence that they were Germans, the Central Union's first line of defense, the Zionists advanced their doctrine that anti-Semitism was inevitable and ineradicable and therefore that a Palestinian home was the only solution to the Jewish problem. However much one may disagree with this basic Zionist dogma, it has turned out as a practical matter that emigration was the only solution for Jews under Nazism.

Yet the actual predicament of German Jews presents no difficult problems for Brenner: "anti-Nazism" is his only answer. But was not the Zionists' activity for emigration to Palestine, as we now may see, also one mode of rescue of thousands of Jews, against whom Nazis had lethal intentions? Again, one does not have to be a Zionist to recognize that the durability and the perniciousness of anti-Semitism has turned out to be more intense and long-lasting, even 50 years after the Holocaust, in light of the incredible development of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and in many other parts of the world. But Brenner's sectarian inflexibility does not permit him to modify classic Left attitudes which events have forced us to revise. He
construes “rescue” in the narrowest terms.

In order to give the problem a broader and more real setting than Brenner has done, we need to make some distinctions. The ostensible opposite to collaboration is overt resistance. From the time of Nazi power to its defeat, many people, as I myself did, totally identified resistance with overt anti-Nazi action. But in the perspective of the years since, we have gained an awareness of the great variety of ways in which people coped with Nazism and the Holocaust, and active resistance was not the sole laudable method. Any actions which tended to frustrate Nazi aims in the long or short runs were also forms of resistance. Jewish survival itself was one such form, since it defeated Nazi genocidal aims.

Not all Jews, or everyone opposed to Nazism in all lands, were either in a position to offer confrontational resistance for which we honor so many, by inflicting physical, tactical or strategic damage on the Nazis. Were not the archival activities of an Emanuel Ringelblum and the many memoirists who wrote in the future about Jewish life under the Nazi reality; or the refusal of a Janusz Korczuk to abandon the children under his care on their death journey; or escape from the Nazis by any method, including bribery, or successfully remaining concealed from the Nazis; or surviving the death camps — were these not also forms of resistance?

Of course immediate saving of Jewish lives was one extremely important form of resistance. But the concept of saving lives is broader than that of rescue, which means removal from an imminent life-threatening situation of place of danger. Rescue, it seems, is Brenner’s sole concern. But this option was not available to the millions of Jews under the Nazi heel. Moreover, emigration from Germany under Zionist auspices seems somehow less eligible to Brenner because it was tainted with the Zionist and Palestine connection. Nazism demonstrated to the world, if proof were needed, the urgent need of a haven for Jews to escape chronic anti-Semitism; Palestine served as this haven for many thousands who fled from genocide. Yet emigration to Palestine receives only snide treatment from Brenner.

Brenner charges Zionism with “racism” from its beginnings. His second chapter is entitled, in part, “The Roots of Zionist Racism.” He does not explicitly make the connection with the infamous United Nations General Assembly resolution, “Zionism is a form of racism,” but his emphasis on Zionist “racism” in various parts of the book makes the connection inescapable to any informed reader.

Among the “documentation” to support his view is his quotation (p. 51) of German Jewish statements in their journal, Judische Rundschau, in 1933. German Jews, said the journal, “have to respect racial consciousness and racial consciousness of the German people absolutely.” In the aforementioned memorandum that the German Zionists sent the Nazis requesting a conference, one reads: “On the foundation of the new state, which has established the principle of race, we wish so to fit our community into the total structure so that for us too, in the sphere assigned to us, fruitful activity for the Fatherland is possible. . . . We believe in the possibility of an honest relationship of loyalty between a group-conscious Jewry and the German state” (Brenner, pp. 48-49). Joachim Prinz, who in 1963 walked alongside Martin Luther King, Jr., in the great 1963 anti-racist Washington demonstration, wrote in his early (Continued on page 28)
years in Germany in 1933, “A state which is constructed on the principle of the purity of nation and race can only have respect for Jews who see themselves in the same way” (Brenner, p. 52).

In conclusion, therefore, Brenner asserts that the German Zionists “convinced themselves that because they, too, were racists, against mixed marriage — the Jews were allies in Germany . . .” (Brenner, 89). But nowhere does Brenner quote the Zionists as calling themselves “racists,” and with good reason. The term is so new that the Second Edition of the unabridged Webster Dictionary does not even contain the word in the body of the book, but only among the special section on “New Words,” “added in 1939.” There “racist” is the adjectival form of “racism,” defined as “description of inherent racial superiority” or “the purity and superiority of certain races, and the consequent discrimination against other races.”

How far this concept is from the Zionists’ is clear from Brenner’s own paraphrase of some Blut und Boden articles which were reprinted in the Rundschau in 1933 from their original of fear under men’s reasoning, a sense of continuity with generations gone before can stretch like a lifeline across the scary present.” Stretching over four generations, starting its seventh decade, Kinderland extends to us, across the scary present, a lifeline. Tenaciously, we cling to it, for in the cultural wasteland and political swamp that constitute Reagan’s America, Camp Kinderland gives us the strength to be different. Happy Birthday! Bz hundert un tzwontzik — 120 and beyond!
appearance before 1914. Brenner comments, “But although these mimics of the Nazis were confirmed racists, they were not chauvinists. They did not think they were racially superior to the Arabs” (p. 52). Going on to summarize their views, Brenner says that “the journal indicated that the races could live in harmony. Jews were warned: now that they were to become racists, they should not become chauvinists: above race is inhumanity” (p. 52). A most unorthodox, not to mention un-Nazi, form of “racism.”

Brenner’s application of “racism” to Zionism can thus be seen to be semantic trickery. First he shows that early Zionists such as Herzl, Martin Buber and even the young Einstein before World War I referred to the Jews as a “race.” At that time “racial” theories were common coin and intellectually fashionable. Buber even advanced the mystical notion of Jewish Blut und Boden (Blood and Land). But Buber and Einstein and others soon outgrew this mischievous theory (Buber was a leading advocate of Arab-Jewish rapprochement for years), and could hardly be said to concur in the Nazis’ racist theories. Some Zionists in 1933 did recall earlier race theories in a desperate defense against the Nazi assault. But this does not make the German Zionists “racists” in the same sense in which this term is used today. The special feature of today’s usage must include belief in the inherent superiority of one race over another, as Webster and experience tell us.

“Race” in the past century has undergone a bewildering variety of meanings. “Race” is described in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 13 (1968), as follows: “The term ‘race,’ or its various ethnosemantic glosses, is applied in vernacular contexts to human popula-

Another count in Brenner’s indictment is that Zionism assigned highest priority to building Palestine rather than to rescue. In some ways the decision-makers of the Zionist movement were in a similar dilemma as confronted those Judenrat ghetto leaders dedicated to resistance (there were some) or inmate camp leaders who were compelled from time to time to submit lists of the next Nazi murder victims. Should they have had a principle of selection or made random selections? What principle of selection, if any, should they have followed? If they were Zionists, to what sort of persons should they have given preference for emigration?

The dilemma for the Zionist officials was that in the 1930s only a limited number of emigrants from Nazism was permitted. The evidence is that insofar as they were able, Zionist leaders chose the young, the strong, those best equipped to build up an economically undeveloped country. In the 1930s, the Italian Labor Zionist leader Enrico Sereni, who was Zionist emissary to the Nazis to assign 1,000 certificates for emigration of German Jews to Palestine, said, “We must allot most of the 1,000 emigration certificates to pioneers... This may seem cruel... Let the young people go, for even if they suffer less than the older ones, they are better fitted for the task in Palestine. Children can bring their parents, but not the other way around” (p. 144). A relentless reality necessitated a cruel logic.

Among the targets of Brenner’s intense criticism is the American Zionist
leadership for having done what Brenner considered almost nothing to save Jews. Yet, it is a fact that some American Zionist leaders, like Rabbi Stephen S. Wise and the then preeminent Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, were among the most militant anti-Nazi influences in the Jewish community, and among the most persistent in pressing for a boycott. They had to endure severe pressure from the most powerful Jewish organizations and others like them, to soft-pedal their public anti-Nazi activity.

The fact that Rabbi Wise was sometimes ambivalent about some measures like the boycott, or was reined in by his estimate of the hazards to the Jews in the domestic situation of the 1930s and was weighed down by the heavy responsibility he assumed for Jewish welfare in the U.S. during this period, gives Brenner a target for criticism. This is so especially in relation to the Revisionist campaign in the U.S. 1942-1944, led by, among others, several Revisionists who enlisted Ben Hecht as chief propagandist. It is true, in retrospect, that the widespread excitement caused by their panoramic theatrical presentations and newspaper advertisements signed by numerous theater celebrities did help prepare the ground for creation of the War Refugee Board in 1944.

But in Brenner’s indictment of the failure of the Zionist — or any — Jewish leadership to save Jews, he fails to give anything like an adequate account of the domestic context in which such efforts were made. No one maintains that the Jewish leadership did nearly as much as it could have done to rescue Jews from the Nazis. They could have done more to bring public opinion to bear on our government to do something. Yet Morris U. Schappes has indicated with precise factual evidence (see *Jewish Currents*, Sept., 1983, pages 28-33) the obsta-

**FROM ELSINORe, CALIF.**

We received on March 12 a donation of $1,250, sent by the Jewish Cultural Club, Paul J. Mundel, treasurer. Mr. Mundel added, "You may publicize it in your magazine for others to follow our example."

The Management Committee deeply appreciates this act of solidarity with our progressive Jewish cause. Who will follow this example?

icles in the way of action for rescue and a boycott, and how unfavorable conditions were for success. One cannot assume, in the face of the ineluctible facts he brings to bear, what course of action had any chance of success without also doing injury to U.S. Jews in the process in the prevailing atmosphere.

Brenner’s prejudiced pleading is manifest in his failure to place the problems connected with rescue in their full historical context. Nor is he justified in his tricky application to Zionism of the term “racism,” as we have shown, nor does he give consideration to the extremity in which German Jews found themselves. Surely severe criticism is in order in many places, including the Zionist movement. But from the security of our lives as Jews in the U.S. today, 50 years after the event, some compassionate regard for that extreme situation is in order, too. A much fuller examination of the total situation, which is not to be found in Brenner’s book, is required before historical judgment is passed.

**REMEMBERING**

Norman Finkelstein, Leo Torgov,
Rudy Haber, Larry Friedman,
Bill Schulz, others, dead
in Spain, March, 1938
46 years!